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Abstract: This article starts by presenting a rough sketch of what the so-called 
tacit knowing view is all about and questioning the intellectualistic and 
objectivistic view of knowledge (section 1). Then, different meanings of the term 
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1 Knowledge as a substance? 
Talking about ‘knowledge’ (and not, for example, about skill, mastery of an art, 
understanding, ability, judgment ...) invites us to seek not competences but invisible 
cognitive repertoires that are supposed to underlie competent behaviour: that is, a hidden 
mental substance (propositions, programmes, rules, algorithms, theories ...), as well as 
mental processes using that substance. But in ascribing knowledge to people, we impute 
to them not mentally stored knowledge of this or that sentence, but the ability to perceive, 
to think, and to act skilfully. We are interested in knowledge in use rather than in 
knowledge as a state.  
Basically, the tacit knowing view (a) concerns knowing, i.e. not mental storage places 
and their contents, but processes (e.g. perception, judgment, action, thought, discernment, 
contrivance) and the underlying human dispositions; (b) focuses on the relationship 
between knowing and its articulated counterpart; and (c) argues that we know more than 
we can ‘tell’. This latter proposition usually has one or both of the following meanings: 
(Some) human dispositions are unformalisable. It is impossible to program a computer so 
that, by means of rules, it simulates a knowing person with regard to the particular 
disposition. 
(Some) human dispositions are unteachable solely by verbal instruction. It is impossible 
to instruct a learner verbally in such a way that he follows in the teacher’s footsteps with 
regard to the particular disposition (i.e. so that e understands/can do the same without 
first-hand experience or demonstrations). 
Both meanings are informed by the conviction that it would be dangerous to 
believe that explicit knowledge of propositions, rules, or theories is a sufficient condition 
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for knowing; and that it is even dangerous to believ  that such knowledge is always a 
necessary condition. Furthermore, an important corollary is the assertion that all (even 
the most academic) professions have a craft side, which, once learned, is undetachable 
from the knowing person. 
Such a view stands in opposition to mighty traditions f thought on human insight 
and action. From the intellectualist or cognitive vi wpoint (for a detailed critique see 
Neuweg, 2000, after Ryle, 1949), knowledge is essentially propositional. Roughly 
speaking, everything we do is seen as deriving from propositions in our head and from 
thought processes dealing with these propositions. Seen this way, to do something 
intelligently is always to do a bit of theory and a bit of practice, practice being nothing 
but applied theory. (The view admits that we are often unable to articulate how we 
proceed in carrying out a task. But this is said to indicate the proceduralisation of 
previously conscious rules, the execution of which is now mere routine.) Given this 
picture, teaching seems to be just transfer of information, and learning seems to be just 
storage of information.  
This concept, of a memory full of conscious and uncons ious ‘mental’ rules and 
schemata that ‘cause’ intelligent behaviour, has some important consequences. For the 
scientist, it suggests that, in order to detect the ‘causes’ of skilful doing, research in 
knowledge has to focus on the ‘mind’, its content ad its architecture, rather than on 
observable behaviour over time. And it suggests that t e elicitation and codification of 
the expert’s knowledge is not only of theoretical interest but also of practical importance. 
To view knowledge as some bulk of conscious and uncons ious propositions entails 
viewing it as more or less easily detachable from knowing subjects. This would have 
important practical benefits. For example, externalising the substance hidden in the 
expert’s brain enables us to shorten a beginner’s larning process. Indeed, if all we know 
were transposable into words and detachable, we could impart many years of experience 
to a learner in just a few weeks. Furthermore, if people’s knowledge is put down to rules 
and external procedures, people become replaceable ither by machines and technology 
or by other people. 
But not only educationists and business economists find the idea of ‘objective’ 
knowledge tempting, its more famous intercessors have already been seduced. Popper 
(1972, 107, 108), for example, intends to show the existence of a so-called ‘world 3’ of 
objective thoughts, existing independently of, and in addition to, the (physical) ‘world 1’ 
and ‘world 2’ (the world of states of consciousness, mental states or dispositions to act). 
Imagine, he says, that some catastrophe destroys our machines and tools together with 
our subjective knowledge of them and their use, while libraries, as well as our capacity to 
learn from books, survive. It is clear, he argues, that we would not have difficulty in 
rebuilding our civilization. Is it? 
In the late 1960s, a Canadian research laboratory succeeded in constructing a 
special device, the so-called TEA-laser. Harry Collins (1985) studied attempts by British 
laboratories to build copies of the device. The findings strongly challenge Popper’s 
thoughts: (1) No scientist succeeded in building the laser by using only information found 
in written sources; they all obtained a crucial comp nent of knowledge through personal 
contact. (2) No scientist succeeded in building the laser where the informant was a 
‘middle man’ who had not built the device himself. (3) Even where the informant had 
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built a device himself, the learner would be unlikely to succeed without some extended 
period of contact with the informant. (4) The flow of knowledge was partly invisible, so 
that scientists did not know whether they had the rel vant expertise until they tried it. 
Collins concluded that tacit knowledge is a crucial omponent in laser building, and that, 
therefore, written information alone turned out to be an inadequate source. 
From the predominant intellectualist point of view, such findings are surprising. 
Given that intelligent action is the outcome of delib ration and knowledge, why should 
experts be unable to express all that they are able to do in words?  
Because practice is not always a client of its theory.  
Firstly, there is empirical evidence against the intellectualist viewpoint. If 
knowing and deliberating are necessary conditions for skilful action, then what about the 
skilled expert doing his job intuitively? Following Michael Polanyi (PK, 49) ‘the aim of a 
skilful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which are not known 
as such to the person following them.’ Although, for example, the cyclist knows how to 
ride a bicycle, he is unable to state the rules of the art; i.e. that in order to compensate for 
a given angle of imbalance we must take a curve on the side of the imbalance, of which 
the radius should be proportional to the square of the velocity over the imbalance. And, 
on the other hand, if knowing and deliberating were sufficient conditions for intelligent 
action, then what about theorists being unable to do what they know? In an experiment 
conducted by Renkl et al. (1994), for example, it was shown that graduate students of 
economics were less successful than laymen in controlli g a computer-based economic 
simulation—maybe not despite, but because of, their broader base of explicit knowledge. 
And finally, it is well known that expert performance can break down if subjects try to 
focus on specific components of the skill and govern its execution by rules (see, for 
example, Masters, 1992). 
Secondly, there is a strong logical argument against the intellectualist point of view 
(cf. Ryle, 1949). If action is caused by deliberating, intelligent action presupposes 
intelligent deliberation. Following the intellectualist’s construction, deliberation must be 
caused by further instruction to be intelligent. In order to avoid an infinite regression, the 
intellectualist must suppose deliberation to be intlligent in itself. That is not just plain 
wrong (people might deliberate very unintelligently), it is also inconsistent. If there are 
second-order acts that are intelligent per se, why should there not be also first-order acts 
that are intelligent per se?  
 
2 The concept of tacit knowledge 
Given the fact that people need not necessarily think before acting intelligently (think 
of the intelligent fluent speaker who talks fluently because he does not contemplate his 
words before he speaks), and that people definitely cannot prescribe all their intelligent 
behaviour (due to an infinite regression, one could never start acting at all), in what sense, 
then, are we allowed to ascribe knowledge to people?  
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It is important to distinguish carefully between knowledge in a psychological sense 
(first person’s knowledge) and knowledge reconstructed from the observer’s point of 
view (third person’s knowledge). According to the intellectualist viewpoint, the intuitive 
actor has propositional knowledge ‘in mind’, albeit unconsciously. Ryle (1949) has 
shown that this point of view is subject to a category mistake. The ascribed knowledge-
base merely functions as a construction to describe, explain and predict behaviour; the 
only objective mode of existence for this knowledge is behaviour over time, or, as Ryle 
(1949, 57, emphasis G. N.) puts it: ‘Overt intelligent performances are not clues to the 
workings of minds; they are those workings.’ People behave as they do, not because they 
have ‘unconscious’ rules in mind, but, at best, as if they had. In this sense, tacit 
knowledge is essentially implicit in one’s behaviour and does not consist of internally 
represented rules—although it can be partly reconstructed and symbolised, either by the 
subject or by the observer. And memory is not a storage place of symbolic 
representations, it is ‘the name we give to the capability of behaving in similar ways in 
similar situations’ (Clancey, 1990, 61). 
This is not to say that the relationship between know-how and explicit knowledge is 
just one between practice and its description. It is also one between practice and its 
intrinsic or extrinsic instruction, of course. But the question, ‘What knowledge does the 
expert unconsciously apply?’ turns into two totally different and more fruitful questions:  
To what extent does third person’s knowledge describe the knowledge of the first 
person? (Or: To what extent can explicit know-that simulate know-how?)  
To what extent is explicit knowledge suited for instructing know-how? 
 
2.1 Main meanings of the term ‘tacit’ 
We are now ready to look at three different—though interrelated—meanings of 
‘tacit’, which can be found in the pertinent debate. 
(a) Tacit knowing often means doing something intellig ntly in an intuitive 
manner. Experienced women and men ordinarily reveal a kind of knowledge that does 
not stem from a prior act of deliberation. Although somebody might be able to articulate 
corresponding rules before or afterwards, there need not be any self-instruction during 
the course of action. (In some sense, every kind of acting is intuitive, as it is impossible to 
do something and to reflect upon one’s own action at the same time.) Consequently,  
‘“thinking what I am doing” does not connote “both inking what to do and 
doing it”. When I do something intelligently, i.e. thinking what I am doing, I am doing 
one thing and not two. My performance has a special procedure or manner, not special 
antecedents’ (Ryle, 1949, 32). 
(b) By reflecting on our actions we can try to make descriptions of the knowing 
implicit in them. Knowing-in-action becomes knowledge-in-action. It is important to note 
that the term ‘knowing’ refers to a dynamic quality, whereas ‘facts’, ‘rules’ or ‘theories’ 
are static. Therefore, descriptions of knowing-in-action are always constructions, 
‘attempts to put into explicit, symbolic form a kind of intelligence that begins by being 
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tacit and spontaneous’ (Schön, 1987, 25). This leads to the second meaning of ‘tacit 
knowing’ as the residue left unsaid by a defective articulation. In this stronger sense, tacit 
knowledge means that ‘we can know more than we can tell’ (Polanyi, TD, 4): somebody 
is able to judge or act skilfully without being able to articulate what it is that he knows or, 
at least, to articulate it appropriately.  
The workaday life of the professional, Schön (1983, 49  50) argues, depends 
heavily on this kind of knowing: 
‘Every competent practitioner can recognise phenomena—families of symptoms 
associated with a particular disease, peculiarities of a certain kind of building site, 
irregularities of materials and structures—for which he cannot give a reasonably accurate 
or complete description. In his day-to-day practice he makes innumerable judgments of 
quality for which he cannot state adequate criteria, and he displays skills for which he 
cannot state the rules and procedures. Even when he mak s conscious use of research-
based theories and techniques, he is dependent on tacit recognitions, judgments, and 
skilful performances.’  
(c) Even if the actor is unable to articulate fully what it is that he knows, this need 
not cause serious problems for detaching knowledge from people: The third person’s 
analysis might reveal the first person’s knowledge. In a third and still stronger sense, tacit 
knowledge means that even the third person is unable to describe intelligent action in 
terms of rules. Here we meet a crucial point. Some psychologists think of tacit knowledge 
as an assemblage of ‘unconscious’ rules computed by the actor that careful analysis could 
reveal. And it might well be that in some cases thiview is appropriate. But are these the 
really interesting cases, when we have human expertise in complex environments and ill-
structured domains in mind? 
Rules are abstract and standardised, whereas the expert has to deal with concrete 
cases and their variations. As no general proposition can fit every detail of the particular 
state of affairs, the expert must be sensible. But if we view his good sense as a product of 
the acknowledgement of further general principles, we end up in an infinite regression of 
rules and principles. To put it another way: ‘To a partly novel situation the response is 
necessarily partly novel, else it is not a response’ (Ryle, 1976, 125). Note that the point 
here is not that skilful acting is ‘intuitive’; it might well be highly conscious. But it does 
not follow strict and formalisable rules. It is creative. And this is Ryle’s point against the 
reduction of thinking to mere computation: 
‘When considering abstract questions about the intellec  we are apt to treat arith-
metical computation as its most typical exercises—a if the best thinkers in their best 
moments are doing in their heads the sort of things that computing machines do, only 
much faster, in their complex insides. I don’t know where this superstition comes from. 
Computation is, though very important, so low a form of thinking that a well trained 
cashier can do lengthy and complex computations while t nking about something else. 
Moreover, pure computation-tasks offer no scope whatsoever for originality, talent, flair, 
horse sense, taste, judiciousness in the weighing of evidence, or constructiveness in the 
building up of chains of argumentation’ (Ryle, 1979, 52). 
We sometimes refer to tacit knowledge of this kind as ‘common sense’. To 
deepen our insight into this meaning of ‘tacit’, it is helpful to distinguish between two 
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types of acts (cf. Collins, 1995). Behaviour-specific acts maintain routines. Examples 
include ‘production-line’-type action, such as that portrayed by Charlie Chaplin in 
‘Modern Times’; the standard golf swing; or simple arithmetical operations. Anyone or 
anything that can follow the set of rules describing the behaviour can, in effect, reproduce 
the act. Hence these acts are mechanisable. If we turn to regular acts, we see that in 
important cases the same act can be and must be instant ated by many different 
behaviours, depending on the context at hand. Althoug  this kind of acting is usually 
‘rule following’ and sometimes ‘rule establishing’, it is very difficult to describe the rules 
which we follow when we are doing regular action. Collins gives an instructive example: 
‘(I)t is clear that there are rules applying to my actions as a pedestrian because I 
will get into trouble if I break them—perhaps by walking too close to the single person 
on an otherwise deserted beach, or by trying to keep too far away from others in a 
crowded street—but I cannot encapsulate all that I know about the proper way to walk in 
a formula. The little bits of rule that I can provide—such as those in the previous 
sentence—are full of undefined terms. I have not defined “close”, “distant”, nor 
“crowded”, nor can I define all my terms on pain of regress. What is more, what counts 
as following the rule varies from society to society and situation to situation. A set recipe 
for walking will be found wanting on the first occasion of its use in unanticipated 
circumstances; perhaps the next people on the beach will be actors in a perfume 
advertisement playing out the mysterious attractiveness of a particular aroma, while the 
next people in the street will be living in the time of a contagious epidemic disease!’ 
Note that to act skilfully in working life we mostly have to act regularly, not 
behaviour-specific. It is very common that an effective form of industrial disruption is to 
act too uniformly, to ‘work to rule’. This point becomes especially important where 
bureaucratic work systems are replaced by individual and organisational flexibility. 
 
2.2 Three different types of tacit knowledge 
It should be pointed out that the use of the term ‘tacit knowledge’ outreaches the 
realm of doing. We can see this in distinguishing three different types of tacit knowledge. 
(a) Whenever we talk about arts, e.g. the art of cooking, the art of teaching, or the 
art of managing, we refer to tacit knowing-how, the tacit side of expertise which is more 
or even other than just the application of theory. Tacit knowing-how comprises all 
dispositions to judge or act, and forms what Polanyi (PK, 87) has called the ‘ineffable 
domain’. Polanyi emphatically invites us to accredit ‘skills and connoisseurship as valid, 
indispensable, and definitive forms of knowledge’ (M, 32, 33), not least because of the 
necessity of bringing the theoretical body of sciene to bear on experience: 
‘Students of chemistry, biology, and medicine [...] seek to bridge the gap between 
the printed text of their books and the facts of experience. They are training their eyes, 
their ears, and their sense of touch to recognise the things to which their text books and 
theories refer. But they are not doing so by studying further textbooks. They are acquiring 
the skills for testing by their own bodily senses the objects of which their textbooks 
speak. [...] Textbooks of chemistry, biology, and medicine are so much empty talk in the 
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absence of personal, tacit knowledge of their subject matter. The excellence of a 
distinguished medical consultant or surgeon is due not to his more diligent reading of 
textbooks but to his skill as a diagnostician and healer—a personal skill acquired through 
practical experience. His professional distinction therefore lies in a massive body of 
personal knowledge’ (M, 31, 32). 
The tacit component in connoisseurship and skills is easy to see if we consider 
motoric skills and impressionistic knowledge. It is d fficult to explain how to juggle with 
five balls, how to class cotton, or how to interpret a patient’s facies; typically the expert 
will refer to the ‘right feel’. But it is important to see that there is a tacit component even 
in the most abstract forms of judgment and action. Take, for example, our ability to 
reason correctly without considering the rules of logic, the art of applying theories of 
different kinds in a context-sensitive way, or to maintain intelligent practices for which 
there are no written rules at all; e.g., the practice of invention. 
(b) In our behaviour we also show a lot of tacit knowing-that, which is difficult if 
not impossible to describe. It is knowledge taken for granted, our cognitive background, 
interpretative frameworks, viewpoints, paradigms, mental models, beliefs. Again, it is 
Michael Polanyi (TD, 64, 65) who gives an instructive example of the way tacit knowing-
that functions. He refers to a letter published by Nature, the author of which ‘had 
observed that the average gestation period of different animals ranging from rabbits to 
cows was an integer multiple of the number π. The evidence he produced was ample, the 
agreement good. Yet the acceptance of this contribution by the journal was meant only as 
a joke. No amount of evidence would convince a modern biologist that gestation periods 
are equal to integer multiples of π. Our conception of the nature of things tells us that 
such a relationship is absurd, but cannot prescribe how one could prove this.’ 
Following Searle (1983, ch. 5), it would be a hopeless endeavour to specify all our 
tacit beliefs, not only because a great number of them are submerged in the subconscious 
but also for two further reasons: firstly, they are not individuated (we do not know, for 
example, how to count them); secondly, in trying to explicate them we would encounter 
states that are in a sense too fundamental to be called ‘beliefs’” or elements of ‘know-
that’ (e.g.: ‘objects offer resistance to touch’—whatever one does with objects, one does 
not in addition think subconsciously that they offer r sistance to touch). 
(c) If we use the prevalent signs for knowledge, for example the spoken sentence, the 
text-book, the database, are we then really talking about knowledge? We are not. Sound 
waves, printing ink, and magnetic disks are just physical objects, not knowledge, until 
somebody understands what he or she reads or hears. Knowledge is a psychological 
phenomenon, not a physical one. Therefore, ‘tacit knowledge’ might also refer to the tacit 
roots of all our explicit knowledge, i.e. to its semantic and pragmatic basis. ‘There is a
possibility of knowledge only if one understands the concepts u ed and the contexts in 
which the sentences are normally used, and that is not the same as having the ability to 
repeat the sentences parrot-fashion’, Molander (1992, 14) remarks rightly. And as it is 
meaning that constitutes knowledge, ‘a wholly explicit knowledge is unthinkable’ 
(Polanyi, KB, 144). All knowledge is, at bottom, tacit, because deprived of their tacit 
coefficients, all spoken or written words would be m aningless; explicit knowledge must 
rely on being tacitly understood and applied in order to be knowledge at all. 
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3. Transmitting and acquiring tacit knowledge 
3.1 Basic didactical ideas 
It is common knowledge that the acquisition of practical knowledge requires 
learning by doing. ‘We learn how by practice, schooled indeed by criticism and example, 
but often quite unaided by any lessons in the theory’, Ryle argues (1949, 41). And 
indeed, shifting the emphasis from expertise in verbalising to expertise in doing supports 
the view that ‘what we need is not so much theories, articles, books, and other conceptual 
matters, but, first and foremost, concrete situations to be perceived, experiences to be 
had, persons to be met, plans to be exerted, and their consequences to be reflected upon’ 
(Kessels/Korthagen, 1996, 21).  
Given that experts always know more than they can tell and even more than 
anyone could ever formalise, it seems clear that expert knowledge cannot be transmitted 
by prescription alone. Hence, tacit knowledge, at le st in the strong sense, has to be 
learned implicitly: ‘An art which cannot be specified in detail cannot be transmitted by 
prescription, since no prescription for it exists’ (Polanyi, PK, 53). Some authors even 
define the concept of tacit knowledge by its didactical implications, as does Molander 
(1992, 11): 
‘Knowledge transmitted through models or exemplars—through exemplary action, as in 
the master-apprentice relationship—and knowledge which is attained through training 
and personal experience may be called “tacit knowledge”. This is a good label because 
the core of such knowledge does not consist of verbal or mathematical formulations, it 
consists of abilities to make judgments and to do things in practice, skilfully and with 
insight.’ 
Although tacit knowledge is not teachable, it is coa hable. What must be left 
unspoken is to be attained through personal experience and is to be transmitted within 
master-apprentice relationships and cultures of expert practice. Polanyi’s analysis of tacit 
knowledge leads him to advocate apprenticeship as indi pensable for the acquisition of 
tacit knowledge. He emphasises that skills, whether practical or intellectual, can be 
passed on only by example from master to apprentice: ‘By watching the master and 
emulating his efforts in the presence of his example, the apprentice unconsciously picks 
up the rules of the art, including those which are not explicitly known to the master 
himself’ (PK, p. 53). Because the range of diffusion is restricted to that of personal 
contact, traditions of how to act skilfully may be lost if they fall into disuse for the period 
of a generation. Polanyi gives the example of violin-making (SC, 387): ‘It is pathetic to 
watch the endless efforts, equipped with microscopes and chemistry, with mathematics 
and electronics, to reproduce a single violin of the kind that half literate Stradivarius 
turned out as a matter of routine more than 200 years ago.’ Furthermore, Polanyi argued 
that this apprenticeship must be an uncritical one. The more hidden the rules, the more 
the apprentice must surrender himself uncritically to the imitation of the master and the 
 72 
more he has to be convinced that there is something important to learn. Indeed, the 
paradox of learning a new competence lies in the fact that ‘a student cannot at first 
understand what he needs to learn, can learn it only by educating himself, and can edu-
cate himself only by beginning to do what he does not yet understand’ (Schön, 1987, 93). 
Within the realm of tacit knowledge, Polanyi pays special attention to 
connoisseurship. This faculty has to be trained case-based. The importance of case-based 
instruction can be exemplified by the practice of Common Law (PK, 53, 54). Courts 
follow precedents considered in other courts, for they see the rules of law embodied in 
prior decisions. In doing so, they recognise that pr ctical wisdom is more truly embodied 
in action than in expressed rules of action. From this, common education in schools and 
universities could learn a lot. It often teaches what to do in situations of a certain type by 
representing these situations as verbal vignettes. But in reality, we have to react to 
situations, not words. To choose a particular course of action requires a correct 
subsumption of the concrete situation in general terms. This faculty of judgment and 
discrimination is essential for applying the appropriate rules (if there are any). But it 
cannot be developed by simply giving further rules, for what one must learn to recognise 
is a situational pattern in which the elements might vary, and the meaning of a situational 
detail is always context-related (cf. Neuweg, 2001, ch. 12, for more details on expertise 
and pattern recognition).  
Beyond these more or less obvious didactical ideas, further hints can be derived 
by studying Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge more closely. It basically rests upon an 
analysis of the architecture and working of human co s iousness. Within this framework, 
learning appears as a process of interiorisation, of making things function as if they were 
part of our body (cf. Neuweg, 1998). The learning process aims at the instrumentalisation 
of elements, objects, actions, theories, in the servic  of some purpose. Therefore, the 
master ought to encourage the learner to direct his or her attention primarily to the object 
being worked on, and only subsidiarily to the theoretical and practical means applied. To 
establish relationships between parts and wholes and between means and ends, to endow 
parts and means with meaning, the learner must concentrate on the ‘distal’ (Polanyi), the 
situation’s ‘back-talk’ (Schön), the overall context or purpose. By doing so, the learner 
becomes aware of elements, objects and actions not in themselves but as tools; in terms 
of operational results achieved through their use. For if the learner experiences his actions 
‘only subsidiarily, in terms of an achievement to which they contribute, its performance 
may select from them those which the performer finds helpful, without ever knowing 
these as they would appear to him when considered in themselves. [...] Hence the 
practical discovery of a wide range of not consciously known rules of skill and 
connoisseurship which comprise important technical processes that can rarely be 
completely specified, and even then only as a result of extensive scientific research’ (PK, 
62). 
Polanyi would have strongly agreed with Schön (1987, 158) in saying that the 
learner needs to grasp a skill ‘as a whole in order to grasp it at all [...]; for the pieces tend 
to interact with one another and to derive their meanings and characters from the whole 
process in which they are embedded.’ This is not to say that all tacitly learned pieces 
would be unspecifiable; but drawing attention to them would disintegrate performance 
and deprive them of their meaning. 
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3.2 Some caveats and qualifying remarks 
Parts of the tacit knowing debate tend to overemphasise the difference between 
theoretical and experiential knowledge, and to overl ok the benefits of critical reflection. 
At least the following remarks should therefore be added:   
(1) Much of what we learn is picked up incidentally, and often one can do the 
learning better if the mind does not get in the way of its analysis and rules. But even if 
knowledge has to be considered as tacit to a large extent, this does not imply that it has to 
be learned wholly implicitly, i.e. without explicit instruction and without conscious 
attempts to detect underlying rules. In most cases, learning involves some balance or see-
saw between relatively controlled, analytical and more spontaneous, integrative 
processes, the right blend varying both with the person and the subject being learned. In 
particular, it is sometimes necessary to draw the learner’s focal attention to the details 
and to formulate pedagogically helpful rules (for this reason, a master is not necessarily a 
good teacher for beginners).  
Although Polanyi argued that ‘an unbridled lucidity can destroy our understanding 
of complex matters’ (TD, 18), he was fully aware of the benefits of analysis, and thought 
‘an oscillation of detailing and integrating’ to be ‘the royal road for deepening our 
understanding of any comprehensive entity’ (SEP, 333). A continual journey back and 
forth between analysis and synthesis is highly desirable, provided that analysis helps to 
render more of the tacit components focally known, ithout disintegrating our central 
focal meaning beyond repair. Polanyi gives the example of motion studies, which tend to 
paralyse a skill, but will improve it when followed up with practice. In cases of this kind, 
‘the detailing of particulars, which by itself would destroy meaning, serves as a guide to 
their subsequent integration and thus establishes a more secure and more accurate 
meaning of them’ (TD, 19). Furthermore, in many cases the destructive effects of 
analysis can be counteracted by explicitly stating he relation between the particulars. 
‘Where such explicit integration is feasible’, says Polanyi (TD, 19), ‘it goes far beyond 
the range of tacit integration.’ (Nevertheless, one must see that an explicit integration 
cannot replace its tacit counterpart. The skill of a driver cannot be replaced by schooling 
in the theory of the motorcar, nor are the rules of rhyme or prosody necessary conditions 
for enjoying a poem, and indeed, they can even destroy enjoyment.)  
(2) Polanyi’s idea of a see-saw between experience, analysis, reflection, and 
integration is closely related to the more elaborate concept of reflection to be found in the 
work of Donald Schön (1983, 1987). If a practitioner r flects in the midst of action, he 
focuses ‘interactively on the outcomes of action, the action itself, and the intuitive 
knowing implicit in the action’ (Schön, 1983, 56), always attending to the peculiarities of 
the situation at hand. This is what Schön calls reflection-in-action. He makes clear that it 
would be mistaken to view the alternation between analysis and integration as nothing 
more than an intermediary state in the process of becoming an expert. The very practice 
that leads to expertise also endangers it: tacit knowledge is often tacit blindness. 
Therefore, the question, ‘how one could combine a critical stance towards knowledge 
with the protection and cultivation of “tacit” aspects of knowledge, if this is at all 
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possible’, has rightly been identified as a key problem concerning unarticulated 
knowledge (Molander, 1992, 10). An expert is not only a person who acts intuitively, but 
also someone who has not ceased to learn! 
(3) In many domains, the emphasis on tacit knowledge should not seduce us into 
underestimating the necessity of a broad theoretical background for skilful action. Take 
the example of medical diagnosis, to which Polanyi often refers. The identification of a 
specific disorder surely requires massive experiential background; but the expert’s ability 
to perceive significant patterns of illness is also necessarily dependent upon his 
knowledge of medical theory. In general, the relationship between tacit knowing and the 
professional knowledge taught in schools should be treated as an open question, the 
answer depending on the respective task.  
What remains tacit and has to be learned experientially, however, is the 
knowledge of how to apply theory to phenomena. Application can never build upon a 
theory of application. Furthermore, what might become tacit in the course of time are the 
details of theory in its propositional form. The exp rt might be aware of the theory just in 
terms of the phenomena that are seen in its light, because for gaining an understanding of 
a situation, one need not be fully conscious of what one has studied in order to use it 
interpretively: ‘A theory’, Polanyi argues, ‘is like a pair of spectacles; you examine 
things by it, and your knowledge of it lies in this very use of it. You dwell in it as you 
dwell in your own body and in the tools by which you amplify the powers of your body’ 
(M, 37; see also Broudy, 1970, for an analysis of tacit ‘knowing with’). 
(4) Given that instruction and theoretical studies form an essential part of a 
curriculum, where should they be placed? Remembering that all explicit knowledge has 
and must have tacit roots, it is clear that not only do we sometimes need a great deal of 
instruction to understand experience; we also need a great deal of experience to 
understand a theory’s meaning or what instruction is telling us. What the learner sees is to 
a large extent dependent on what he hears the master s y; yet the meaningfulness of what 
he hears is itself at the same time dependent on his capacity to see what the words 
indicate. That is why Schön (1987, 103) pleads for instructions in the context of the 
student’s doing: ‘Instructions are always and inevitably incomplete. Unless we already 
know how to do the thing in question, there is always  gap between the instruction and 
the action it describes—a gap we are unlikely to detect, except when we listen in the 
mode of operative attention.’ Polanyi strongly agrees that rules should be observed within 
the context of skilful performance, as ‘the premises of a skill cannot be [...] understood if 
explicitly stated by others, before we ourselves have experienced its performance, 
whether by watching it or by engaging in it ourselves’ (PK, 162). 
Theoretical as well as experiential learning might t erefore benefit greatly if 
connected in parallel. If we synchronise language and things, we will always find a dual 
movement of comprehension (and if the two fall wholly apart we risk the danger of a lack 
of comprehension in both realms). To illustrate this dual act of sense-reading, Polanyi 
uses the vivid example of a medical student attending a course in X-ray diagnosis of 
pulmonary diseases. He watches shadowy traces on a fluorescent screen and hears the 
radiologist commenting to his assistants. At first he can see nothing that is talked about 
nor does he understand the language used. But as he goes on listening for a few weeks the 
pictures begin to make sense—and so do the comments ade about them:  
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‘Thus, at the very moment when he has learned the language of pulmonary radiology, the 
student will also have learned to understand pulmonary radiograms. The two can only 
happen together. Both halves of the problem set to us by an unintell gib e text, referring 
to an unintelligible subject, jointly guide our efforts to solve them, and they are solved 
eventually together by discovering a conception which comprises a joint understanding 
of both the words and the things’ (PK, 101, emphasis mine). 
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Zusammenfassung: In den letzten Jahren hat das Konzept des impliziten Wissens 
zunehmend mehr Aufmerksamkeit auf sich gezogen. Der Beit ag charakterisiert im ersten 
Abschnitt das theoretische Rückgrat dieses Konzepts und stellt den tacit knowing view 
als Gegenposition zur intellektualistischen und objektivistischen Auffassung von Wissen 
vor. Im zweiten Abschnitt werden verschiedene Bedeutungen des Begriffes "implizit" 
und unterschiedliche Formen impliziten Wissens differenziert. Im dritten Abschnitt 
schließlich werden Implikationen für den Prozess des Wissenserwerbs erörtert. 
  
Schlüsselbegriffe: implizites Wissen - intuitiv-improvisierendes Handeln - Kennerblick - 
Know-how - Learning-by-doing – Erfahrungslernen 
 
